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uYAH COURT OF
STATE OF UTAH
—-000O000—

W i l l ANN ,ILI-PERIE:.i,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.
rial Court No. 924701612DA
ppeal Court No. 940373-CA

WILBUR R. JEFFERIES,

Defendant/Appellant.

—000O000—

APPELLEE'S BRIEF

JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to the provisions
7R ?*••!(? )(\) ol the Utah Code and Rules 3 and 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it included Appellant's retirement
I

hi . in |II11|II 11v ill IIii" nii-irilal estate?
This Court will affirm the division of marital assets in a divorce proceeding absent
decision, this Court will "presume the

correctness of the court's decision absent 'manifest injustice or inequity that indicates

a clear abuse of. . . discretion.'" Crockett v. Crockett. 836 P.2d 818, 819-20 (Utah App.
1992) (citations omitted).
2. Where Appellant failed to object either to a finding of fraud by the trial court
or to argue that the children of the parties were necessary additional parties for the
resolution of the issue of Appellant's dissipation of marital assets, has Appellant waived
this Court's consideration of those issues?
"Because [Appellant] did not raise th[ese] matter[s] before the trial court, we do
not address [them] for the first time on appeal." Crockett, 836 P.2d at 821.
Additionally, this Court will affirm the decision of the trial court on any proper
ground. White v. Deseelhorst. 879 P.2d 1371, 1376 (Utah 1994); Bailev-Allen Co.. Inc.
v. Kurzet. 876 P.2d 421, 424 (Utah App. 1994); Embassy Group. Inc. v. Hatch. 865 P.2d
1366, 1370 (Utah App. 1993); Slatterv v. Covey & Co.. Inc.. 857 P.2d 243, 247 (Utah
App. 1993).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES,
RULES AND REGULATIONS WHOSE INTERPRETATION ARE
DETERMINATIVE OF THE APPEAL OR OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO
THE APPEAL.
U.C.A. § 30-3-5(1) (1994) provides:
When a Decree of Divorce is rendered, the court may include
in it equitable orders relating to the children, property, debts
or obligations, and parties.
42 U.S.C. 402(c)(1)(D) which provides:
"(1) The husband (as defined in section 216(f) [42 USCS §
416(f)]) and every divorced husband (as defined in section
216(d) [42 USCS § 416(d)]) of an individual entitled to oldage or disability insurance benefits, if such husband or such
divorced husband 2

***

(D) is not entitled to old-age or disability insurance
benefits, or is entitled to old-age or disability insurance
benefits based on a primary insurance amount which is less
than one-half of the primary insurance amount of such
individual, shall (subject to subsection(s)), be entitled to a
husband's insurance benefit for each month, beginning with (i) in the case of a husband or divorced husband (as
so defined) of an individual who is entitled to an old-age
insurance benefit, if such husband or divorced husband has
attained retirement age (as defined in section 216(1) [42
USCS § 416(1)]), the first month in which he meets the
criteria specified in subparagraphs (A), (B), (C), and (D), or
(ii) in the case of a husband or divorced husband (as
so defined) of (I) an individual entitled to old-age insurance
benefits, if such husband or divorced husband has not
attained retirement age (as defined in section 216(1) [42
USCS §416(1)]), or
(II) an individual entitled to disability insurance
benefits, the first month throughout which he is such a
husband or divorced husband and meets the criteria specified
in subparagraphs (B), (C), and (D) (if in such month he meets
the criterion specified in subparagraph (A)),..."

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The trial court granted the parties a divorce after the parties had been married
more than 20 years. On May 25, 1994, the trial court entered a final Decree of Divorce
with supporting Findings. The Decree and Findings were entered on May 26, 1994. See
Addenda MA" and "B". Appellant did not file any post-trial motions objecting to the
Decree or the Findings of the trial court.
FACTS RELEVANT TO THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW.
The parties, residents of Davis County at the time of the filing of this action, were

3

married November 10, 1973 (Finding of Fact paragraph 2, R.1106.) Two children were
born as issue of the marriage (paragraph 4, R. 1106). The trial court acting through
Judge Rodney S. Page awarded each of the parties a Decree of Divorce from the other
on grounds of irreconcilable differences. (R. 1129).
FACTS RELEVANT TO FIRST ISSUE.
Appellant is the Executive Director of the Wasatch Front Regional Council, an
inter-governmental agency. He has been serving as its Executive Director since 1976
and employed by the Wasatch Front Regional Council since 1972 (Defendant's Exhibit
34, R. 73-74, 753 - 754). As an employee of the Wasatch Front Regional Council, he
participated in two retirement programs, a plan implemented pursuant to 26 U.S.C.
§ 401(a) and a plan implemented pursuant to Title 26 U.S.C. § 457. (R.659-660, 672.
Exhibits 11D, 14D, 15D, 16D and 17D.) The Wasatch Front Regional Council offered
and administrated these plans in lieu of participation in the Federal Social Security
system. (Defendant's Exhibits 14D, 15D, and 16D). By virtue of this election, Appellant
does not have any claim to Federal Social Security benefits as a result of his
employment though he does have such a claim as Appellee's former spouse. 42 U.S.C.
§ 402(c)(1)(D) (R. 661, 1159).
Contributions are made to the 457 Plan directly from Appellant's salary and are
not subject to tax until they are removed from that Plan. (R. 606-607, 659-660, 672.)
Unlike Social Security, the funds in the 457 Plan belong to the Appellant and can be
withdrawn without penalty if he leaves his employment, is disabled or retires regardless
of his age. (R.672.) The Wasatch Front Regional Council takes the percentage that it

4

would normally pay as the employer's contribution to the Social Security Plan and places
that in the 401 Plan as a contribution on behalf of the Appellant. (R. 667.) While the
401 Plan could be divided between the parties, the Section 457 Plan cannot be divided
by a Qualified Domestic Relations Order. (R. 672-673.)
FACTS RELEVANT TO THE SECOND AND THIRD ISSUES.
During the marriage the Appellant made gifts to the parties' children totaling
$145,725.00 by depositing that amount in accounts established in their names at Dean
Witter Reynolds and Shearson Lehman pursuant to the Utah Uniform Gift to Minor's Act,
(R. 631-632, 1033-1036, 999, 1048, 1055-1056, Exhibits 29D, 30D, 31D, 32D, 34D and
23P). After examining the records of these transactions, in particular Defendant's Exhibit
46 and Plaintiffs Exhibit 23, the trial court determined that most of these sums were
deposited between 1991 through 1993. (R.397, 1077.) This was after the parties had
started having serious marital problems and had gone to counseling in an attempt to
resolve those problems. (R.26, 755-756.) Appellant made regular deposits in these
accounts but in no year did they exceed $10,000.00 per child and thus no gift tax returns
were filed. (R.1048.)
Appellee did not know these accounts existed (R.741). Appellant had set up the
accounts with the children (R. 1042-1043) and while the Appellee had discussed early in
the marriage putting money away for the children, she never knew how large the
amounts were or that the accounts existed (R. 741, 1035).

Appellee never saw

statements from either the Shearson Lehman or the Dean Witter Reynolds accounts
(R.1056). Appellant had the statements delivered to a post office box (Exhibits 29D,
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30D, 31D, 32D, 46D and 23P, (R. 1036). Additionally, Appellee never saw the children's
tax returns (R.741, 1036) as the Appellant had the children sign their own tax returns (R.
1036) and never discussed the accounts, or returns, with Appellant (R.631-632).
Appellee learned about these accounts which totalled $145,725.00 only through
discovery during the course of the divorce, (R. 632).

Generally, Appellant did not

discuss financial matters with the Appellee (R.719) and Appellee did not agree that the
$145,725.00 belonged to the children (R. 736).
The trial court found in regard to these accounts:
It's obvious to the court, however, that those amounts were
deposited without the knowledge of the Plaintiff and without
her consent. Further evidence of that, all statements were
sent to a separate Post Office box which was maintained
solely by the Defendant.

The court finds that those sums came from assets and
monies which were acquired during the marriage and were
marital assets, and the diversion of those funds to accounts
in the Defendant's name and the children's names was in fact
a fraud upon the Plaintiff and upon the marital estate, and
therefore finds that any transfer made under the Uniform
Gifts to Minors Act to those two accounts on behalf of the
children are void and those sums are brought back into the
marital estate.
(R. 397, 1077-78.)

Appellant never objected to these Findings after they were

announced from the bench or by filing any type of post-trial motion.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The trial court properly divided the retirement benefits accumulated by the
Appellant between the parties during their marriage. The funds in the 457 account were
withheld from the pay of the Appellant. Had they not been withheld, they would have
6

been received as marital income and used by the parties.

The 401 account was

accumulated by Appellant's employer on his behalf. Both accounts are marital assets
required to be divided between the parties in their divorce by Utah Law. The trial court
properly exercised its discretion in finding that both accounts were marital property and
divided them as part of the marital estate. In addition, Appellant is eligible for Social
Security benefits by reason of Appellee's participation in Social Security in a marriage
exceeding 10 years.
Appellant argues in this appeal that the minor children should have been made
parties to the action and that taking their property is a denial of due process of law. This
argument was never made to the trial court either at trial or post-trial. Accordingly,
Appellant has waived this Court's consideration of these issues. However, even if the
Court considers the waived issues, the trial court properly determined that Appellant
defrauded the marital estate by removing these assets and that this property should be
brought back into the marital estate and divided.
If Appellant violated any of his duties to the children under the Uniform Gift to
Minors Act, he alone stands responsible to the children for those actions and he can
make up their losses. However, Appellant's breach of his fiduciary duty to the children
is not before the Court and does not impact upon his duty to the marital estate.
On appeal, Appellant argues that fraud was not shown by clear and convincing
evidence. However, this was not presented to the trial court and this Court should refuse
to consider it for the first time on appeal. Even if this Court does consider whether there
was sufficient evidence to support a finding of fraud, the evidence was clear and
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convincing that the Appellant defrauded Appellee and the marital estate. Moreover, even
if this Court were to determine that Appellant has not waived this issue and that there
was insufficient evidence to support the finding that removal of marital property from the
marital estate and placing it in the names of the children is fraud, the Court could still
affirm the trial court's ruling on the ground that Appellant's actions were a dissipation of
marital assets and that Appellant is responsible to the marital estate for the amount of
that dissipation.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY
RETIREMENT ACCOUNTS.

DIVIDED

ALL

This Court will affirm the division of marital assets in a divorce proceeding absent
an abuse of discretion.

In reviewing that decision, this Court will "presume the

correctness of the court's decision absent 'manifest injustice or inequity that indicates
a clear abuse of. . . discretion.'" Crockett v. Crockett, 836 P.2d 818, 819-20 (Utah App.
1992) (citations omitted). Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion, but rather
properly divided the retirement assets of the parties.
The retirement funds accumulated by Appellant in his 457 Plan were taken directly
from his pay. (R. 659-660, 672). The funds accumulated in Appellant's 401 Plan were
contributed by his employer in an amount that would have been contributed by the
employer had Appellant been in the Social Security system. (R.667.) The funds in the
457 Plan are Appellant's and the at the time he leaves his employment, is disabled or
retires, he receives them without penalty regardless of his age (R.672). It was clearly
8

established at trial that: (1) the funds accumulated in Appellant's retirement accounts
were contributed during the marriage; (2) the funds were from his compensation; and,
(3) the funds were accumulated on his behalf (Exhibit 11D, 15D, 16D, and 17D). The
trial court correctly found that these funds were marital assets and divided them between
the parties as part of the marital estate.
The Utah Supreme Court in Enqlert v. Enqlert. 576 P.2d 1274 (Utah 1978)
rejected the claim by a husband that money accumulated in a Veteran's Administration
Hospital Retirement Plan should not have been included and divided as part of the
marital estate. The Court declared:
It is our opinion that the correct view under our law is that
this encompasses al] of the assets of every nature possessed
by the parties, whenever obtained and from whatever source
derived; and that this includes any such pension fund, or
insurance.
k l at 1276 (emphasis added).
Four years later, the Utah Supreme Court rendered its decision in Woodward v.
Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982) in which the husband claimed that his retirement
benefits should not have been divided as part of the marital estate. The Court ruled in
part:
This argument fails to recognize that pension or retirement
benefits are a form of deferred compensation by the
employer. If the right to those benefits are acquired during
the marriage, then the court must at least consider those
benefits in making an equitable distribution of the marital
assets. "The right to receive monies in the future is
unquestionably... an economic resource" subject to equitable
distribution based upon property computation of its present
dollar value.

9

l± at 432.
Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion, but rather correctly applied Utah
law in including the retirement benefits Appellant accumulated during the course of the
marriage and dividing in the property division. Appellant even concedes that this result
is required by the decision of this Court in Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1171 (Utah App.
1990).

In Burt this Court held, "[retirement benefits accrued during marriage must

normally be 'considered a marital asset subject to equitable distribution upon divorce.'"
Id, at 1170 (citation omitted). However, Appellant then asserts that this ruling is in error.
Such an assertion in insupportable. This court in Burt was applying § 30-3-5(1) of the
Utah Code as mandated by the Utah Supreme Court in Englert and Woodward.
Despite this clear line of precedent from the Utah Supreme Court and this Court,
Appellant asserts that because his retirement benefits were accumulated in lieu of Social
Security and he will not obtain Social Security through his own account, his retirement
benefits should have been excluded from the marital estate. The trial court did not
abuse its discretion in rejecting this argument. Appellant incorrectly asserts he will not
receive Social Security benefits. Appellant and Appellee were married for more than 10
years.

Under the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 402(c)(1)(D), the Social Security Act,

Appellant will qualify for benefits as the divorced spouse of Appellee. Though he does
not qualify for social security from his own earnings, he will be eligible for benefits based
upon the Social Security Act as beneficiary of the Appellee's payment of social security
taxes during the course of the marriage.
Appellee agrees that Social Security benefits are not subject to the law of

10

the State of Utah. They are governed by the Social Security Act itself. Appellee agrees,
however, that does not effect this case both because the Appellant is eligible for benefits
from Appellee and because the trial court appropriately exercised its discretion in dividing
Appellant's retirement plan as part of the equitable division of the marital estate.
This issue was recently addressed by the Court of Appeals of New Mexico, a
community property state, which ruled that a trial court erred in considering the wife's
social security benefits and reversed the trial court where it had used her benefits to
effect an equal distribution of the community property. English v. English. 879 P.2d, 802,
807-808 (N.M. App. 1994) cert denied 880 P.2d 867 (N.M. 1994).
Application of that rationale to this case would make irrelevant that the Appellant
does not qualify for social security benefits on his own account as the 457 Plan was
created by contributions from his salary and the 401 Plan contributions built up in his
behalf by his employer during the marriage. This deferred compensation should be
divided between the parties without taking into account the social security benefits as the
courts of New Mexico did in English, supra.
Appellant cites to this court Schneeman v. Schneeman, 615 A.2d 1369 (Pa.
Super. 1992) as support for his position.

However, that case does stand for the

proposition asserted by Appellant. There the Superior Court of Pennsylvania declared
"also exempt from marital property is the part of a pension which is in lieu of social
security." kL at 1375. There are two reasons why the trial court in the instant case
appropriately rejected this authority. The first is that Utah law is not as Pennsylvania law
is declared to be in the quote set forth above. Utah law includes all assets of every kind

11

in the marital estate for equitable division.

The second basis is that in Schneeman

there was no indication that Mrs. Schneeman was a participant in Social Security which
would allow Mr. Schneeman to receive benefits as a divorced spouse who had been
married for ten years.
Appellant also cites Coates v. Coates, 626 N.E.2d 707 (Ohio Com. PL 1993).
However, that ruling is not quite as clear as Appellant presents it. There is an extensive
discussion of the issue of whether or not the present value of social security should be
excluded from a marital estate where one spouse participates in a civil service retirement
and is not covered by social security, but the specific ruling of the court was the Motion
for Declaratory Judgement was denied as "a portion of Plaintiffs Civil Service Pension
should not be exempted from the marital estate to the extent that it is in lieu of social
security benefits." ]<± at 707 (emphasis added). The court in Coates indicated this is
not a summary question, but should be examined more carefully. The general rule of
Ohio that it is more appropriate to consider the present value of the actual social security
benefits of the spouse of the exempt party, rather than the present value of hypothetical
social security benefits of the exempt party, i d at 708. In this regard, Utah law is
clearly different from Ohio if the focus is on the benefits to actually be paid.
This Court ruled in Rudman v. Rudman. 812 P.2d 73, 77 (Utah App. 1991) that
Social Security benefits are not to be considered until they are actually received.
Applying that principle to this case, the trial court's ruling is correct and the issue of who
receives what from Social Security and other retirement benefits is appropriate for
consideration not in regard to the division of the marital estate, but rather the income

12

actually received by the parties bears on the alimony issue, an issue not appealed by
the Appellant. \± Just as this Court has indicated that the division of assets is a fact
sensitive issue which should be decided on each case, so did the Ohio Court of
Common Pleas in Coates declare that it would be inequitable to apply a Social Security
set off in all cases and circumstances and no general rule was articulated by that
decision. In fact, the court concluded by noting that the present value of social security
could be used as a factor, but it could also be rejected as a factor by a court exercising
its equitable discretion in dividing a marital estate. 626 N.E.2d at 708.
Again, as in Schneeman there was no consideration of the fact that the civil
service retirement recipient might have benefits for Social Security benefits because of
the other spouse, a factor present in the instant case.
The third case presented by Appellant is that of Bain v. Bain, 553 So.2d 1389
(Fla. App. 5 Dist. 1990). Examination of this opinion reveals the primary focus of the
decision was the error of the trial court in failing to equitably divide the marital estate by
failing to exclude from the division the premarital contributions to a retirement pension
and contributions made after the original Decree of Dissolution. While this case did
involve considering one spouse earning social security and the other earning a pension
of lieu of social security, no consideration was given to the fact that the spouse of the
social security participant was eligible for benefits because of the duration of the
marriage. While the Fifth District Court of Appeals in Florida considered the different
types of retirement plans, no hard and fast rule was articulated. In the instant matter,
the trial court followed the mandates of this Court and the Utah Supreme Court,
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considered all assets and divided them appropriately and within its sound discretion.
If there is any question remaining, it is what will be the income of the parties at
the time of their retirements if there is still an alimony obligation by Appellant to
Appellee. At that time, this court has directed consideration of the issue based not on
an asset value, but on the income actually received, Rudman, supra. Accordingly, the
trial court did not abuse its discretion by following the precedent of the Utah Supreme
Court and this Court by equitably dividing the parties' retirement benefits.
POINT II

APPELLANT PRESENTED NEITHER HIS ARGUMENT
THAT THE CHILDREN SHOULD BE JOINED AS
NECESSARY PARTIES OR THAT THE BURDEN OF
PROOF FOR FRAUD HAD NOT BEEN MET TO THE TRIAL
COURT AND NEITHER ARGUMENT SHOULD BE
CONSIDERED ON APPEAL.
In this appeal, Appellant argues two issues that were never raised in the trial
court. By not allowing the trial court the opportunity to rule on these issues, Appellant
has waived this Court's consideration of those issues. As this court declared in Crockett
v. Crockett, 836 P.2d 818, 821 (Utah App. 1992), "[w]e are governed by the general
principle that matters not placed in issue at the trial, cannot be considered for the first
time on appeal." Since Appellant did not present to the District Court the argument that
the children were necessary parties to this action or the argument that the fraudulent
actions of the Appellant were not established by clear and convincing evidence, those
arguments may not be raised for the first time in appeal.
Despite this waiver, and in an abundance of caution, Appellee will address these
two points separately and demonstrate that the trial court's decisions were correct or
14

supportable under applicable Utah law.
POINT III
THE CHILDREN ARE NOT NECESSARY PARTIES FOR
PROPER RESOLUTION OF THIS MATTER.
Appellant claims that affirming the trial court requires the joinder of the
minor children of the parties to whom he has given gifts from the marital estate. That
is not true. Whether Appellant defrauded Appellee or the marital estate or dissipated
marital assets, the trial court can appropriately direct Appellant who still has control over
these assets to return them (at least Appellee's one-half) to the marital estate as they
are under his control and he is under the jurisdiction of the court. CI Doritv v. Doritv,
645 P.2d 56 (Utah 1982). If the Appellant breaches his responsibilities to the children
by compliance with this Order, he may be liable to them for violating his fiduciary duties,
but he is and can be responsible out of his separate estate.
There is no question that Appellant, if he has given property to the minor children
of the parties under the Uniform Gift to Minors Act, owes them the responsibility of a
fiduciary in caring for their property.

Buder v. Sartore, 744 P.2d 1383 (Co. 1989),

Jimenez v. Lee, 547 P.2d 126 (Or. 1976). This is a separate responsibility from that he
owed to Appellee, that is not to defraud her on the marital estate and not to dissipate
marital assets. If Appellant has violated duties to both Appellee and the children, he
must face each separately. He must bear the consequences himself as he created the
situation when he fraudulently removed or dissipated marital funds and placed them into
accounts in the children's names. If the children thereafter seek to hold him responsible
when the District Court appropriately orders Appellee's share of these funds returned to
15

the marital estate for distribution, he has a separate obligation to the children. They
need not be joined to this action for that to take place.
However, as between Appellant and Appellee, a complete resolution can be
reached without the joinder of the children. Appellant can leave "his" one-half of the
$145,725.00 with the children if he chooses to do so. Their claims against Appellant,
if any, should be resolved separate and apart from Appellee's claims. The trial court
could not make a property award to the children of the marital property, Jefferies v.
Jefferies. 752 P.2d 909 (Utah App. 1988), and Appellant cannot produce this result
unilaterally. The trial court appropriately prevented this from occurring. If Appellant feels
this is unjust to the children, he is free to make good his "gifts" from his own property.
POINT IV.
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THE APPELLANT
IMPROPERLY ATTEMPTED TO REMOVE PROPERTY FROM THE
MARITAL ESTATE AND ORDERED PART OF IT RETURNED AND
AWARDED TO THE APPELLEE.
Appellant asserts for the first time on appeal, that there is insufficient evidence to
support the trial court's determination that he defrauded the marital estate. Appellee
recognizes that it is normally Appellant's burden to marshal the evidence in support of
a trial court's finding and then demonstrate why that evidence is insufficient to support
that finding.

Ohline Corp. v. Granite Mill. 849 P.2d 602, 604 (Utah App. 1993).

However, a short reiteration of the facts before the trial court demonstrates there was
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sufficient to support the finding of fraud.1
The evidence heard by the Trial Court demonstrated that Appellant placed
$145,725.00 of marital funds in accounts in the children's names under his control the
children had no jobs or source of money that would let them accumulate this fund (R.
631). Once these accounts were opened, Appellee never saw the statements sent by
the brokers (R. 1056). Appellee did not give the funds, ($145,725.00), to the children
(R. 631). There was no discussion between the Appellant and Appellee regarding these
accounts. (R.631). Appellee was not aware of these accounts (R.631-632) and learned
about them only through the divorce discovery (R.632). Appellee testified that Appellant
did not discuss financial matters with her (R. 719) and she did not know that any money
had been set aside for the children's education (R.735, 741). Appellee did not see the
children's tax returns which included evidence of the "education funds" until they were
produced in response to her discovery requests (R. 731). The account records were not
transmitted to the house, they were transmitted to a post office box (Box 770) (see
Plaintiffs Exhibit 23, and Defendant's Exhibits 29, 30, 31, 32, and 46). The children
signed their own tax returns (R.1036). The record is clear that the accounts were set
up by Appellant with the children (R. 1042-1043) and no gift tax was filed to reflect the
gifts being given to the children. (R.1048.) In sum, Appellant removed $145,725.00
from the marital estate without the knowledge of or consent of Appellee and gave these

1

Again, Appellee's demonstration of the sufficiency of the evidence is in an
abundance of caution. Appellant waived this Court's consideration of this issue by failing
to file any post-trial motions which would have allowed the trial court to rule on this
issue.
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funds to the children under his control under the Utah Gift to Minors Act.
The only evidence that existed contrary to the finding of the court is that Appellee
did discuss with the Appellant early in the marriage putting money into accounts for the
children. However, she went on to say that she never knew they were in the large
amounts discovery determined (R.1055) and while Appellant said he discussed these
with Appellee, she testified that they did not. (R.631.)
The evidence outlined above is sufficient to support the finding of fraud made by
the trial court. The veracity of a witness is for the fact finder to determine. Here the trial
court determined that the evidence demonstrated that Appellant defrauded the Appellee
and the marital estate.
Appellant asserts that the evidence of his fraud is not clear and convincing and
requests reversal of the decision. By declaring that Appellant had defrauded Appellee
and the marital estate, the court implied a finding that the evidence of Appellant's fraud
was clear and convincing, Hill v. Hill, 869 P.2d at 965, and simply failed to record that
specific finding. The evidence as marshalled by Appellant fails to demonstrate an error
in this determination.
Additional evidence before the court indicated that Appellant perceived there had
been severe marital problems for four years before the divorce was filed (R.26). He
testified that there had been stress in the family for a number of years (R.755-56). He
placed most of the $145,725.00 in the children's accounts during these "stress" years
and put $8,000.00 into the children's accounts after he had separated from the Appellee
and was involved in his relationship with another woman (R.1038) (Exhibits 23P and
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46D). This evidence not only supports the finding of the court, it is not in the evidence
"marshalled" by Appellant.
This case is similar to that of In re: Marriage of Lee, 615 N.E. 2d 1314 (III. App.
4 Dist. 1993) where several years prior to the divorce action being filed, the husband
began transferring annual $10,000.00 gifts to Totten Trusts for each of the children, then
when the parties were discussing separation, he used $81,404.00 to purchase bonds for
his minor daughter, then a few months later, $45,315.00 for his son. Two weeks before
the parties separated, he transferred an additional $20,000.00 to each Totten Trust.
Then on the day of separation, he transferred an additional $100,000.00 into an
irrevocable trust for the benefit of the children. The trial court found that the husband
had dissipated marital assets in making these transfers. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the Trial Court's compensating the wife for this dissipation by the husband. As the Court
of Appeals noted, if it permitted a finding of non-dissipation of assets simply because
they were transferred out of the marital estate and to the parties' children, it invited a
vindictive spouse to make transfers for the purpose of depriving the other spouse of the
use of his/her share of the marital estate which is particularly inequitable when the
earning power of the two spouses are substantially different. JdL at 1320-1321.2
While the Illinois Court of Appeals affirmed the Trial Court based on dissipation
as opposed to fraud, the same actions can lead to the same result and give this court
an alternative ground for affirming the trial court even if it were to find that evidence of

2

ln this case, Appellant earns three times what Appellee is able to earn and while the
total sums were less, the actions of Appellant were similar to those of Dr. Lee.
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a clear and convincing nature did not exist. White v. Deseelhorst, 879 P.2d 1371, 1376
(Utah 1994), Bailev-Allen Co.. Inc. v. Kurzet. 876 P.2d 421, 424 (Utah App. 1994)
Embassy Group, Inc. v. Hatch, 865 P.2d 1366, 1370 (Utah App. 1993), Slatterv v. Covev
& Co., Inc., 857 P.2d 243, 247 (Utah App. 1993).
An additional ground for affirmance is based on the relationship between Appellant
and Appellee. If Appellant made transfers to the children purportedly on behalf of the
Appellee, then he would have been doing so pursuant to § 30-2-8 of the Utah Code
wherein he would be acting as her attorney (agent) in disposing of property for their
mutual benefit. As such he would be a fiduciary and owe to her the responsibilities of
a fiduciary. If, as the fiduciary, he did not disclose in full the actions he has taken, he
would have breached his fiduciary duty and be liable to Appellee Witbart v. Witbart, 701
P.2d 339, 341 (Mt. 1985) (failure to disclose debts). Cf. Webb v. Webb. 431 S.E.2d 55
(Va. Ct. App. 1993) (failure to disclose information).
On this question the decision of the California Supreme Court in Schnabel v.
Superior Court (Schnabel), 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 200 (Cal. 1993) is particularly instructive.
The California Supreme Court ruled that each spouse has a fiduciary to the other in
managing community property and that duty includes the obligation to make full
disclosure of all material facts and information regarding the existence, character and
valuation of all assets. The evidence is certainly clear and convincing in this case, that
information was not only not given to Appellee by Appellant, it was hidden from her. If
that forms another basis for affirmation of the ruling of the trial court by this Court, it
should do so if that is necessary.
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A similar ruling is that of the Court of Appeals in Oregon in Auble v. Auble. 866
P.2d 1239 (Or. App. 1993) where the court ruled in Oregon there is fiduciary
responsibility between husband and wife imposed because of the confidential
relationship between them and it continues until they act to dissolve their marriage. kL
at 1243-44. Application of that principle to this case demonstrates Appellant breaching
his fiduciary duty to Appellee in transferring property out of the marital estate though
under his control. U.C.A. §§ 75-5a-101 -123.
The trial court found that the Appellant defrauded the Plaintiff and the marital
estate. The trial court made that determination without making a determination as to the
fiduciary responsibility of Appellant to Appellee or on the dissipation of the marital estate.
The trial court did so simply on the basis of the evidence before the court.
evidence, when properly marshalled supports his determination.

That

It is also a

determination which can be upheld on the alternate grounds that Appellant breached his
fiduciary duty to Appellee and/or dissipated marital assets. On any or all of these
grounds, this Court should affirm the trial court's decision.
ATTORNEY'S FEES
APPELLEE SHOULD BE AWARDED HER ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL.
Appellee was found by the trial court to be in need of assistance, in paying her
attorney's fees, which Appellant could provide. She was awarded $8,750.00 to assist
her in payment of those fees. (R.1125, 1135.) She is in need of assistance in paying
the attorney's fees and costs which she has incurred in defending this appeal and those
should be awarded to her. Hall v. HalL 858 P.2d 1018 (Utah App. 1993), Rappleve v.
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Rappleve. 855 P.2d 260 (Utah App. 1993).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The trial court appropriately divided the marital assets of the parties by including
and dividing the retirement accounts. The argument of the Appellant is that because he
does not qualify for social security his retirement account should not have been included
in the marital estate and divided. This was appropriately rejected by the trial court. It
is the law of Utah that all marital assets are to be included and divided by the trial court,
including all retirement accounts.
In addition, the argument of the Appellant that he has no social security benefits
ignores the fact that he qualifies for social security benefits by having been married to
the Appellee for more than ten (10) years and she is a participant in Social Security.
Appellant waived this Court's consideration of his issues II and III by failing to
present them to the trial court. This Court should refuse to consider the merits of those
issues. However, even if this Court addresses those issues, the trial court appropriately
ordered the return of $145,725.00 to the marital estate and properly awarded half of that
fund which Appellant sought to remove from the marital estate to Appellee.

The

Appellant claims that the children should be joined before this property is returned. That
is not necessary. There is jurisdiction over Appellant and he could be ordered to return
the money and divide it with Appellant pursuant to the court's Decree. If that puts
Appellant in violation of fiduciary duties to the children under the Utah Gift to Minors Act,
then that is a separate matter he must resolve with the children. He created that
problem. Appellee would not be involved in that proceeding and Appellant should be left
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to deal with the problems he may have created without Appellee. In addition, he is free
to leave his one-half of the $145,725.00 to the children if he chooses to do so and can
make i jp the balance from his property if that is his desire. What he cannot do is give
Appellee's property to the children or force Appellee to fight with the children as he urges
this Hi mi I In i li '| 111ini ,n in!eve

The evidence of Appellant's fraud on the marital estate and Appellee is clear and
ni ni1" I'l i ni 1 iMH'i I Mi'iiii li nihil', in IIPIIH" mini M I (hi" I ni ni ,11 I'fuiii 'ih nli| |IH ,*ilfii i men I i HI the aitfiiiale
grounds of dissipation of marital assets or bread i of fiduciary

the return to the marital estate of the $145,725.00, or at least that halt c1 t -vnic^ - a*
been awarded to t! le A ppellee.
The Appellee being forced to defend this appeal should be awarded the costs and
attorney's fees she has incurred in having to do so.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellee seeks the affirmation of the ruling of the trial court dividing the retirement
accoi ints accumulated by the parties during their marriage, the award to her one-half of
the $145,725.00 Appellant improperly sought to remove from the marital estate and an
award

e attorney's fees and costs she has incun ed on appeal.
Dated this Jf

day of December,, 1 n n 4.

DAVID S. DOLOWITZ

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am a member of and/or employed in the law firm of
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C, 525 East First South, Ste 500, P.O. Box 11008,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008, and that in said capacity, I caused two true and correct
copies of the foregoing Plaintiff/Appellee's Brief to be delivered to the person(s) named
below:
Clark W. Sessions, Esq.
Jay W. Butler, Esq.
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS
One Utah Center
201 South Main Street, 13th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2215
Counsel for Defendant/Appellant

on this the / T

day of December, 1994.

(dsd\mb\Jefferies. Brief.)
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THE COURT:

I better make that right.

plaintiff is to pay any ordinary office —
doesn't have the custody.

The

excuse me, she

The defendant is to pay that, the

ordinary office calls and those types of things.
MR. PARKER:

I wasn't clear on who you said was

to keep the insurance.
THE COURT:

He is to keep —

do they presently

both have it?
MR. PARKER:

They both do.

MRS. JEFFERIES:

I would be most happy to carry

the children on my policy.
THE COURT:

You both should carry them.

that is the most beneficial thing at their age.
defendant still has the obligation to pay —
right.

I think

The

let's get this

The defendant does have the obligation to pay any

noncovered, just ordinary out-of-pocket expenses as far as
office calls and those kinds of things, and the parties will
share noncovered expenses, one-third to the plaintiff and
two-thirds to the defendant.
The Court will make the following ruling relative
to the monies which are presently being held in the accounts
at Shearson Lehman and the accounts at Dean Witter Reynolds
in the names of the children.
The Court finds that in looking at the records,
that a total of $20,448 has been paid to Nicole from the
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business from 1988 through 1992; that there have been a
total of approximately $22,664 deposited in that Shearson
Lehman account over that same period.
includes up through '93 —

In fact, that

excuse me, the income amounts do

not include '93.
The Court would find that Lon over that same
period has been paid $20,453, and that $23,396 has been
paid, deposited in that account at Shearson Lehman during
that same period.
The Court notes that $15,000 was withdrawn from
Nicole's account by Mr. Jefferies, supposedly in conjunction
with her in the purchase of the condominium and whatever
happened to that, I don't know.

After that point, apparently

he's testified that there was some borrowing done and that
was repaid, but I don't know where that ever shows up.

That

is between him and Nicole.
The Court would find that a $7,000 amount was
withdrawn from Lon's account in 1991 and a bond was
purchased at Dean Witter Reynolds.

The Court would find that

those sums which were deposited in the Shearson Lehman
account in fact constitutes the majority of the earnings
which the children have had during that period of time and
there may be some other incidental amounts which have been
deposited.
The Court therefore finds that those amounts

which remain in the Shearson Lehman accounts belong to the
children.

In addition to that, the bond which can be traced

from the $7,000 withdrawal from Lon's account is also awarded
to Lon as his separate property.
The Court would find that substantial other monies
were deposited in accounts at Dean Witter Reynolds in the
names of Mr. Jefferies and the children, supposedly under the
Uniform Gifts to Minors Act.

The Court would find that those

sums were primarily deposited from the records that I have
from '91 through '93.

I don't know the sources.

It's just

about impossible to determine from the information supplied by
the parties-

It's obvious to the Court, however, that those

amounts were deposited without the knowledge of the plaintiff
and without her consent.

Further evidence of that, all

statements were sent to a separate P.O. box which was
maintained solely by the defendant.
The Court finds that those sums came from assets
and monies which were acquired during the marriage and were
marital assets, and that the diversion of those funds to
accounts in the defendant's name and the children's names was
in fact a fraud upon the plaintiff and upon the marital
estate, and therefore finds that any transfer made under the
Uniform Gifts to Minors Act to those two accounts on behalf
of the children are void and those sums are brought back
into the marital estate.

How I wi11 disburse those funds, I
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don't know, but I make that ruling as far as those funds are
concerned and I will make disposition of them as I proceed
with the other property questions that I have reserved.

The

other matters, I will make written findings and conclusions
on.
Are there any questions that you have on what
I've ruled at this point, Mr. Dolowitz?
MR. DOLOWITZ:

None, your Honor.

question I have is, do you want —

The only

the question is whether

you want partial findings prepared or just wait until there
is a complete

—

THE COURT:
the final ruling.

I want you to wait until I send you

Then you can put it all together.

MR. DOLOWITZ:

Then I have no questions, your

Honor.
THE COURT:

Mr. Parker?

MR. PARKER:

I have no questions.

I didn't hear

when you were dealing with support, what you found the
plaintiff's income to be.
THE COURT:
$2246 per month gross.

I found the plaintiff's income to be
I believe that's consistent with what

was on your affidavit.
MR. PARKER:
THE COURT:
$6,123.

I just didn't quite hear it.
You found the father's income to be

I found it to be $6,000.

The difference being that
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I thought the testimony was that his income from his regular
employment was $72,000 a year.
MR, PARKER:

Is it different than that?

I don't remember what it was

exactly.
THE COURT:

The testimony was it was $72,000 as

testified to by Ms. McGuire, and I divided that by 12 and
that's how I came up with the $6,000 per month.
The Court then will take the matter under
advisement and I will try to rule on that within the next 10
days so you have that before the end of the year.
Anything else to come before the Court,
Mr. Dolowitz?
MR. DOLOWITZ:
THE COURT:
MR. PARKER:
THE COURT:

No, your Honor.

Mr. Parker?
No.
Thank you, Counsel.

I would just

commend you for the manner in which the case was presented,
given all of the things we had to do and you did a good job
of presenting it and I appreciate it.

The Court's in

recess.
Counsel, I'm not sure I was clear on it, but the
Shearson Lehman accounts are to go to the children.
MR. DOLOWITZ:
THE COURT:

We have that, yes.

All right.

Thank you.

(Whereupon the proceedings were concluded.)
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL^ DISTRICT
BY__

y//5

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH
RUTH ANN JEFFERIES,
Plaintiff,

RULING

vs.
Case No. 9247 01612
WILBUR R. JEFFERIES,
Defendant.

This matter having come on regularly for trial before the Court, the plaintiff being
present and represented by Mr. Sandy Dolowitz and the defendant being present and
represented by Mr. Rodney Parker. The Court having heard the evidence of the parties and
the arguments of counsel, ruled on certain matters from the bench at the conclusion of the
trial and reserved for further ruling the issues of property division, alimony and related
matters. The Court having now considered these matters and being fully advised in the
premises rules as follows:
That these parties were married on November 10, 1973. Both of the parties had
worked previously and acquired property prior to the marriage in the form of savings. The
plaintiff brought $17,000.00 or $18,000.00 into the marriage and these funds were used to
purchase furniture, fixtures and to provide for other family expenses.
Approximately one month prior to the marriage, the defendant purchased a home for
$39,200.00. He put $17,000.00 of premarital funds in as a down payment. The title to the

property was in defendant's name alone. The parties resided in the home until June 1, 1974,
when they purchased a home on Elaine Drive in Bountiful. The prior home remained in the
name of the defendant and the mortgage payments and up keep were paid forth from marital
assets. In 1981, the home was sold for $100,420.00 to "Dones". As part of the purchase
price the buyers conveyed two lots to the defendant worth $62,000.00 and paid some
$18,000.00 cash. The buyers also assumed a mortgage of approximately $18,000.00.
The two lots were conveyed to the defendant in his name and were lot 28 and lot 52
of Quail Brook valued at $24,000.00 and $38,000.00 respectively.
Pursuant to an agreement, defendant sold lot 28 back to "Dones" on June 3, 1982, for
the sum of $20,300.00 and subsequently sold lot 52 for $29,000.00 on March 3, 1988, to
one Dubach on terms of $15,000.00 down and the balance of $14,000.00 together with
interest within one year.
There is no evidence as to what happened with the proceeds from the sale of the
home in 1981 or from the sale of the two respective lots. There is no evidence that the
funds went into any separate accounts or were traceable to certain assets so as to maintain
their separate identity.
The plaintiff prior to her marriage to the defendant, received a gift of certain stock
from her uncle. That stock has remained in tact and in her name. The parties have done
nothing with that as a marital asset.
The parties now own two homes which they have purchased during the marriage.
One is known as the Elaine Drive home and was the former family home and the other is the
home on Bountiful Boulevard and was the family home at the time this action was filed. The
defendant and the children voluntarily moved from the family home before this matter was

filed. The plaintiff has continued to reside in the home on Bountiful Boulevard and the
defendant and the two children reside in the home on Elaine Drive.
The children continue to attend the schools that they attended previously.
The home on Bountiful Boulevard is the larger of the two homes.
The home on Bountiful Boulevard has an appraised value of $225,000.00. There is a
mortgage balance of approximately $61,394.00 leaving an equity thereon of approximately
$163,606.00.
The home on Elaine Drive was appraised at $113,000.00. There is a mortgage
balance of approximately $36,880.00 leaving an equity therein of $76,120.00.
Each of the parties have vehicles. The plaintiff has a 1987 Subaru Wagon vamea at
$4,100.00. The defendant has a 1986 Olds Toronado valued at $2,900.00 after deducting a
sum required to repair certain body damage. Defendant also has a 1991 Subaru Sedan
valued at $600.00.
The parties have an airplane which they own as part of a business known as Flying
Start. The parties have agreed that the plane has a value of $55,453.00. They have also
agreed that the plane should be awarded to the plaintiff subject to an obligation on it of
$15,135.00, leaving a net value on the plane of approximately $40,318.00. There is also a
spare airplane engine worth approximately $200.00 as parts.
During the course of the marriage the defendant has been part of a group that has
invested in real estate. In so doing, he has acquired a one-third interest in 9.69 acres in Salt
Lake County; and 8.25% interest in an approximately 26 acres in Salt Lake County; and a
one-forth interest in certain property known as the Jordan Heights property also in Salt Lake
County.

The value of the 9.69 acres is $68,900.00. The defendant's interest amounts to
$22,966.00; the value of the 26 acres in which defendant has an 8.25% interest is
$50,200.00. The defendant's interest is worth $4,141.00; and the value of the Jordan
Heights Partnership property is $103,400.00. The defendant's one-forth interests is worth
$25,850.00.
The Court finds that the defendant borrowed some $32,000.00 from the "Oswald"
Profit Sharing Plan to repay certain credit lines in connection with the video business and the
Flying Start Company in 1992. To secure the payment of those sums the defendant gave a
trust deed note secured by the 9.69 acres and pledged his interest in the Jordan Heights
Partnership. The note was amortized over 9 years and remains in the balance of
approximately $2,800.00 owing. If you deduct the balance owing on the note from
defendant's interest in the 9.69 acres and his interest in the Jordan Heights Partnership
property that leaves a net value on those two properties of approximately $20,816.00.
The Court finds that defendant's partners in these land ventures appear to be
accommodating, allowing him to use the same to secure loans and appear to have the same
investment and ownership goals as defendant. Therefore, the Court does not discount the
value of these properties because of defendant's minority interests therein. Further, the
Court finds that these values were established by evaluation for property tax purposes. The
Court takes judicial notice of the fact that traditionally these values are at least ten percent
below the fair market value. The Court finds that any difference in value caused by
defendant's minority interest is more than offset by the actual value to these properties.
The defendant has purchased a condominium since separation. The Court finds that
the defendant has approximately $5,000.00 equity in the condominium.

At the time of separation the parties had a savings account at First Security with a
balance of approximately $10,995.00. The plaintiff has used that account for her benefit
during that period.
The plaintiff also has a 40IK in her name in a value of approximately $12,716.00.
During the marriage, approximately $145,725.00 was placed in accounts at Dean
Whitter Reynolds in the children's names pursuant to the Uniform Gift to Minors Act. The
Court has previously ruled that these deposits were done by defendant without knowledge of
the plaintiff and constitute fraud upon the plaintiff and upon the marital estate. It is ruled
that these gifts are void and these monies are made a part of the marital estate.
While the parties were married savings accounts have been set in the children's names
at Shearson-Lehman. These accounts have been funded primarily from earnings of the
children while working in the family business and from various gifts they have received.
From these funds a $7,000.00 bond was also purchased for Lon. The defendant has
borrowed certain funds from Nicole's account to put down on the condominium he
purchased.
The defendant has various life insurance policies on his life which have accumulated a
cash value. Beneficial Life Policy has a cash value of $3,399.00; Penn Life has a cash value
of $700.00; and Principal Mutual has a cash value of $659.00.
The plaintiff has a life insurance policy with Beneficial Life with a cash value of
approximately $775.00.
There are also life insurance policies in the children's names with accumulated cash
values.

The plaintiff has been employed by the Utah State Tax Commission for the past
several years and she has acquired a minimum retirement in the State Retirement System.
She has income of approximately $2,246.00 per month. She also has income of
approximately $300.00 per month that she receives from the rental of a room in the home.
The defendant is employed by Wasatch Front Regional Counsel and has a salary of
approximately $72,000.00 annually. That provides a gross income of approximately
$6,000.00 per month.
The Wasatch Front Regional Counsel has opted out of the social security system so
that they have a separate retirement system for their employees. The system provides for
retirement by allowing employees to invest in a 457 plan which is administered by the State
of Utah. In addition, the Wasatch Front Regional Counsel contributes a matching amount
into a separate plan known as a 401a which is administered by Principal Financial.
The plan provides many advantages over social security. Under the 457 plan, all
funds accumulated are paid over to the employee upon termination of employment, death,
disability or unforeseeable severe financial emergencies. The recipient, upon retirement, can
elect a lump sum distribution, periodic payment or certain other alternatives.
Under the 401a plan, the employer makes a contribution on behalf of the employee.
However, the employee can also make voluntary contributions. The contributions made by
the employer are totally vested upon death, retirement or termination. The employee has
several options for pay out including lump sum.
Under this plan, any contributions made by the employee may be withdrawn at any
time but withdrawal before to age of 59 1/2 may be subject to a 10% penalty by the IRS.

Under either of the plans, all amounts in the accounts may be passed to a beneficiary
upon proper designation.
The defendant presently has $233,412.00 in his 457 plan and $222,800.00 in his 401a
plan. All sums were accumulated during the marriage.
Plaintiff has minimal State Retirement, having drawn out some $30,800.00 in January
of 1981 to apply towards the purchase of their home.
Plaintiff has some social security eligibility.
In 1986, the parties opened a business known as "The Video Palace". Over the years
the children have worked in the business and the earnings therefrom were the primary
sources of the children's savings accounts at Shearson-Lehman.
The business has been operating for 7 years and has provided income to the parties.
The assets of the business in addition to the actual videos themselves, consist of certain
computer equipment, a 1983 Dodge Van and a hot air balloon.
Various experts were called to evaluate the business. These estimates range from a
low of $30,000.00 to $35,000.00 to a high of $169,000.00.
The method of depreciation was a critical factor in evaluation as it has a profound
effect on cash flow for evaluation purposes. Too rapid a depreciation rate tends to under
estimate cash flow and too slow a rate tends to over estimate it. For obvious reasons,
plaintiff's experts opted for the slowest depreciation rate and defendant's for the fastest. The
Court would find that the most reasonable depreciation rate would be the one near the faster
rate allowed by the IRS regulations.
The Court further finds that the fair market value established by defendant's expert of
$30,000.00 does not fairly take into consideration the history of the business and its

performance over time and is more a liquidation sale price than the sale price of the going
concern. From the evidence, the Court finds that the fair market value of the business is
approximately $100,000.00. There is owing on the business an obligation in the amount of
$35,000.00 to First Security Bank. The Court therefore finds that the net value of the
business is approximately $65,000.00.
The Court further finds that in addition to monies paid to the children family expenses
have been paid from the business and that family expenses for other household supplies,
food, transportation and entertainment have been subsidized by the business.
The Court does not consider the transaction between The Video Palace and Ms. Stein
in 1993 to have been an arms length transaction. Therefore, the Court has not considered
that for evaluation purposes.
The Court finds that each of the parties has in their possession certain furniture and
fixtures. The Court is unable, based upon the evidence, to place a value on these items.
The Court does find that the parlor grand piano in the plaintiffs possession was
purchased with funds given to her by her parents for that purpose and constitutes a gift from
them. It is not part of the marital estate. The Court further finds that during the course of
the marriage the defendant has acquired certain tools, equipment, personal property and
certain firearms.
The Court finds that the parties have incurred debts during the course of the marriage
a mortgage on each of the two homes, a balance owing on the business, a balance owing to
the Oswalds Profit Sharing Plan, the obligation owing on the airplane in the business known
as Flying Start, taxes owing on the Bountiful Boulevard home, the debts the defendant has
incurred since separation to Zions on the piano and a car purchased for Nicole.

The Court finds that neither of these parties will be able to maintain the same
standard of living that was available while they were residing together. The Court finds that
the plaintiff's requested expenses were unreasonable regarding the amount that she claimed
for tuition when the Court sees no real advantage to additional education, for entertainment
expenses in excess of $100.00 per month, for children's expenses in the amount of $200.00
per month in light of her obligation to pay child support and for vacation expenses of
$150.00 per month. Taking that into consideration the Court finds that the plaintiff has
reasonable expenses of approximately $2,724.00 per month.
The Court finds that the expenses claimed by the defendant are unreasonable in that
food expense for the three people in excess of $400.00 per month is excessive particularly in
light of the Court's finding that the cost of food, household supply, transportation and
entertainment expenses are subsidized to some extent by the business as valid business
expenses. The Court finds that clothing expense in excess of $100.00 is also unreasonable as
is a dental and medical expense of $150.00 per month for where each of the parties carry
insurance. Entertain expenses in excess of $100.00 is also unreasonable given the manner in
which business expenses are handled. The Court further finds that the obligation on Nicole's
car is a voluntary obligation incurred by the defendant after separation. That any sum for
Nicole's car in excess of $175.00 is excessive given the circumstances of these parties. The
Court further finds that the deduction of $400.00 per month for a new car for the defendant
is also excessive given the circumstances of the parties. The Court further excludes the
payment to Zions Bank for the piano which was purchased after the date of separation for
that reasons the Court considers it frivolous. The Court further finds that a claim of $150.00
for allowance for the children is unreasonable in light of their history of employment with

the business. For reasons which will become clear further in the opinion, mortgage payment
claimed by the defendant is excessive to the sum of $483.00. Based upon the forgoing the
Court finds that a reasonable expenses for the defendant approximate $4,000.00 per month.
The Court finds that the plaintiff has a net income of $1,588.00 per month, plus
$300.00 rental from the rental of a room in the home and that she should receive
approximately $300.00 per month interest income from funds awarded to her. That she is
without sufficient funds to meet her reasonable expenses.
The Court finds that defendant has income $6,000.00 per month with net income of
between $4,500.00 and $4,700.00 per month not including monies which he is able to
receive from the business or the money that he saves by subsidizing family obligations
through business expenses. In addition, he will have child support from the plaintiff in the
sum of approximately $300.00 per month.
The Court finds that the plaintiff has incurred attorney's fees of approximately
$30,000.00 based on 319 hours having been contributed by two attorneys and two paralegals.
Mrs. Jefferies did much of the computations as to the graphs and business expenses offered
in evidence by the plaintiff.
Defendant has incurred attorney's fees of $20,653.00 based upon total hours of 165
attributed by counsel and co-counsel.
The Court finds that this case was not extremely complicated. It did have certain
novel issues as to retirement and the usual factual issues involving a family business and its
value. However, the Court finds that to have spent 319 hours on this particular case is
unreasonable.

The Court finds that given the complexity of the case, the nature of the issues and the
results obtained that 150 hours is a reasonable amount of time to spend on this case by
attorneys who are as knowledgeable in the area of domestic relations as these two attorneys
are. A reasonable attorney's fee would be $125.00 per hour.
From the foregoing findings of facts the Court concludes as follows:
That the plaintiff should be awarded the home on Bountiful Boulevard subject to the
mortgage thereon and the equity therein in the amount of $163,606.00 for the reason that the
plaintiff is presently living in the home and defendant voluntarily removed himself therefrom.
Given the disparity of the income between the parties, it is highly unlikely that plaintiff could
purchase such a home on her own. Further, by allocating this equity to the plaintiff, it
allows the defendant to retain a greater portion of his retirement.
The home of the parties on Elaine Drive should be awarded to the defendant subject
to the mortgage thereon and together with the equity of approximately $76,120.00 for the
reason that is where the defendant and the children have been residing since the separation.
It appears to meet their needs. Given the defendant's income, he has the capacity to move
up if he so desire.
The plaintiff should be awarded the Subaru Wagon with a value of $4,100.00. The
defendant should be awarded the 1986 Olds Toronado with a value of $2,900.00. The
plaintiff should be awarded the airplane subject to the indebtedness thereon in the amount of
$15,135.00 for an equity of $40,318.00 and the defendant the spare airplane engine.
The defendant should be awarded his interest in the 9.69 acres and the one forth
interest in the Jordan Heights Partnership property subject to a lien in the amount of
$29,000.00 to the Oswald Profit Sharing plan, leaving a net equity in those two parcels of

$20,816.00. The defendant is further awarded the 8.25 percent interest in the 26 acres with
a net equity of $4,141.00. The defendant should be awarded the condominium purchased
subsequent to the separation which has an equity of $5,000.00.
The plaintiff should be awarded the savings account at First Security Bank in its
original sum of $10,995.00 for the reason that she had the use and benefit of that account
during the pendency of these matters and has used certain of those sums to pay her expenses
during that period.
The plaintiff should be awarded the 401(K) in the amount of $12,716.00. Each of the
parties should be awarded half of the sums in the Dean Whitter Reynolds account in the
amount of $145,725.00. Any income taxes incurred as a result of this withdrawal is to be
born equally by the parties.
The plaintiff should be awarded her Beneficial Life policy with a cash value of
$775.00.
The defendant should be awarded his Beneficial Life policy with a cash value of
$3,399.00, his Penn Life policy with a cash value of $700.00 and his Principal Mutual policy
with a cash value of $659.00.
The defendant should be awarded The Video Palace together with the furniture and
fixtures, the vehicle and the hot air balloon subject to the indebtedness thereon of
$35,000.00, leaving a net equity of $65,000.00.
The Court finds that the retirement program of the defendant in the form of a 457
plan and a 401a are plan substantially different from social security in both the rate of return
and the ownership interest which the defendant has in the plans. That ownership interest
allows him to be fully vested in all sums contributed and among other things allows him to

withdraw those sums in lump sum or periodically as he may choose upon retirement, death
or termination and to pass his interest to beneficiaries. All of these benefits are substantially
more favorable than the usual social security benefits. For that reason, the Court does not
accord to these retirement benefits the same protection as is required the federal law for
social security. Therefore, the Court concludes that these retirement plans are joint marital
property and subject to division in this proceeding.
The defendant should be awarded the sums in his 457 plan in the amount of
$233,412.00 free and clear of any claim of the plaintiff.
The plaintiff should be awarded $201,000.00 of the 401(a) plan free and clear of any
claim of the defendant. The defendant should be award $21,800.00 from the 40K$ plan free
and clear of any claim of the plaintiff.
The Court concludes that the total value of the property previously awarded should be
approximately equal.
Each of the parties should be awarded those items of personal property presently in
their possession together with any furniture and fixtures. The Court finds that they are
essentially equal.
Each of the parties should be awarded his or her own personal property and
possessions.
The defendant should be awarded his tools, power equipment and sporting goods
including firearms free and clear of any claim of the plaintiff.
The Court orders that the tools and equipment used for yard care and maintenance are
to be divided equally between the parties. As an exception to the Court's ruling above, the
Court orders that defendant return to the plaintiff the electric garage door opener, hose

attachments to the vacuum, one of the computers, a CD player and in the event that there is
more than one Sega and Nintendo player, one is to be returned to the plaintiff.
The parties are ordered to divide equally any family photographs which they may
have acquired during the course of their marriage.
The Court considers those items of furniture and fixtures used by the children to be
the property of the children.
The Court considers that the $17,000.00 initially contributed by the plaintiff to the
marriage and the $17,000.00 initially invested in the home purchased by the defendant to
have become marital property. The funds have been co-mingled and as such have lost their
identity as separate premarital property. Therefore, the Court considers them as marital
property in the allocation made between the parties herein. The Court further finds that
stock given to the plaintiff by her uncle which has remained in her name has not been comingled and is her sole and separate property and not subject to distribution.
The sums in the children's names at Shearson-Lehman and Lon's bond are awarded to
the children.
The plaintiff should be ordered to assume and discharge the debt due and owing on
the home on Bountiful Boulevard including any taxes and on the airplane is awarded to her
and to hold the defendant harmless thereon.
The defendant should be ordered to assume and discharge the debt and obligation due
on the home on Elaine Drive, the obligation due and owing on the business, the balance of
any sums owing on the airplane in excess of $15,135.00, the balance due and owing to the
Oswald Profit Sharing plan and any other debts or obligations incurred during the course of

the marriage or which he has incurred subsequent to the day of separation. The defendant is
to hold the plaintiff harmless thereon.
The Court finds that the plaintiff is in need of additional support to meet her monthly
expenses. Although, the Court finds that the plaintiff will receive certain interest payments
from the funds awarded to her, she will still need additional support in order to meet her
monthly expenses.
The Court concludes that in light of the defendant's income from the Wasatch Front
Regional Counsel, his other investments, child support he will be receiving and the benefits
incident to the ownership of the business, he is in a position to provide assistance to the
plaintiff by way of support. The Court therefore concludes that the defendant should be
ordered to pay to the plaintiff the sum of $700.00 per month as and for alimony.
The Court further concludes that a reasonable attorney's fee in this matter would be
$18,750.00, given the difficulty of the case, the issues involved and the result. The Court
concludes that the plaintiff has the ability to contribute to said attorney's fees but is without
sufficient funds to pay all her fees without a substantial invasion of the marital estate given
her income. The Court finds that the defendant, given his superior earning ability, has the
ability to contribute to such fees and orders that he does so in the amount of $8,750.00.
The plaintiffs counsel is to prepare findings of fact, conclusion of law and judgment
in accordance with the Court's ruling and submit the same to Mr. Parker at least ten days
prior to the time it is submitted to the Court for signature.
Dated this

l g > ^ day of February, 1994.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing ruling, on the
•fcb

day of February, 1994, postage prepaid to the following:

Rodney Parker
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, UT 84145

David Dolowitz
525 East First South
Fifth Floor
P.OBox 11008
Salt Lake City, UT 84147-0008

Peggy BoumkL Deputy Clerk
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DAVID S. DOLOWITZ (0899)
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL
525 East First South
Fifth Floor
P.O. Box 11008
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008
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Attorney for Plaintiff

M
L i

L{i

l ! LJ kli

'"'

BY___:4P,
uu J •

'
.- ; ,
. • -

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

RUTH ANN JEFFERIES,
Plaintiff,

—oooOOOooo—
)
) FINDINGS OF FACT AND
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

v.

) Civil No. 924701612DA

WILBUR R. JEFFERIES,

) Judge: Rodney S. Page

Defendant.

)
—oooOOOooo—

The above-entitled matter came before the court, the Honorable Rodney
S. Page presiding for trial on the 9th and 10th day of December, 1993, with the closing
argument on December 15, 1993. The Plaintiff was present in person represented by
counsel, David S. Dolowitz. The Defendant was present in person represented by
counsel Rodney R. Parker. The court after hearing the evidence of the parties and the
arguments of counsel, ruled on certain matters from the bench at the conclusion of trial
and reserved for further ruling the issues of property division, alimony and related
matters. Having considered those matters and being fully advised in the premises, the
court issued its ruling on the 18th day of February, 1994. Accordingly, the court makes

and enters the following as its

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The Plaintiff was a resident of Davis County, State of Utah the date

this action was filed and had been so for more than three (3) months immediately prior
thereto.
2.

The parties are husband and wife having been married November

3.

Irreconcilable differences arose between the parties which made

10, 1973.

continuation of their marriage relationship impossible.
4.

Two children were born as issue of this marriage, Nicole L. Jefferies,

born on January 7, 1977, and Lon Mark Jefferies, born May 7, 1980. Pursuant to the
stipulation of the parties, care, custody and control of the minor children of the parties
should be awarded to the Defendant subject to reasonable visitation as that is defined
in Utah Code Ann. Section 30-3-35. Provided, however, the relationship between the
children and Plaintiff is strained. For that reason, visitation is something that will have
to be worked out between Plaintiff and the children. Recognizing that problem and that
the children may not be willing to go to stay over night, the court orders visitation every
other Saturday and at least four hours on an evening during the off week.
5.

The court finds that Mr. Jefferies has, if not purposely, at least

subjectively, interfered with visitation by planning competing activities with the children
on periods of time which were designated for visitation by the children with the Plaintiff,
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and in that way, subjectively interfered with custody and the relationship between the
Plaintiff and the children.
The court also considered the purchase of the vehicle for Nicole which
encumbered the Defendant in the amount of $400.00 per month, if not outright, at least
a subtle attempt on his part to adversely influence the children against their mother.
The court further finds that the Defendant has exercised undue influence
over the children in order to gain their favor by the purchase of the piano, which was
entirely inappropriate given the temporary status of this matter, and the fact that the
child, Nicole, was primarily concerned with the violin during this period of time. It also
served to divert assets of the marriage.
6.

The Defendant should be enjoined and prohibited from planning

activities with the children which compete with their visitation with their mother and from
otherwise interfering with visitation.
7.

The Plaintiff is employed with the Utah State Tax Commission and

earns an income of approximately $2,246.00 per month and receives $300.00 per month
from a rental of a room in her home and will also receive approximately $300.00 per
month interest income from the cash awarded her in this action.
8. The Defendant is employed with Wasatch Front Regional Council and
is paid a salary of $72,000.00 annually with a gross income of approximately $6,000.00
per month.
9.

The court finds that through their employment, both parties may

maintain health and accident insurance on the children. The court determines that the
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Defendant should maintain the primary health and accident insurance on the minor
children subject to that being available through his employment and the parties are to
share any uninsured medical expenses with the Plaintiff paying one-third and the
Defendant paying two-thirds. The Defendant shall pay any regular office and ordinary
medical expenses. The Plaintiff is to share only in the extraordinary uninsured medical
expenses.
10.

By application of the Uniform Child Support Guidelines of the State

of Utah, the Plaintiff should pay to the Defendant the sum of $307.00 per month as child
support for the two minor children of the parties. Child support should continue for each
child until that child attains majority and graduates from high school with his/her regularly
scheduled graduating class.
11.

Both parties were employed prior to the marriage and acquired

property which they brought into the marriage in the form of savings. The Plaintiff
brought in $17,000.00 to $18,000.00 into the marriage and these funds were used to
purchase the home on Elaine Drive and for other family expenses.
12.

Approximately one month prior to the marriage of the parties,

Defendant purchased a home for $39,200.00. He used $17,000.00 of his premarital
funds as a down payment on this home. He took title to this property in his name alone.
The home on 1062 East 2200 South purchased by the Defendant prior to the marriage
of the parties remained in his name. The mortgage payments and upkeep were paid
for from marital funds throughout the marriage of the parties. In 1981 this original home
was sold for $100,420.00 to the "Dones". As part of the purchase price, the Buyers
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assets of the business, in addition to actual videos themselves, consist of certain
computer equipment, a 1983 Dodge Van, and a hot air balloon. Various experts were
called to evaluate the business. These valuations ranged from a low of $30,000.00 to
$35,000.00 to a high of $169,000.00. The method of depreciation is the crucial factor
in valuation. It has a profound effect on the cash flow for valuation purposes. Too rapid
a depreciation rate tends to underestimate cash flow and too slow a method, tends to
over-state it.

For obvious reasons, the Plaintiffs experts opted for the slowest

depreciation rate and the Defendant's were the fastest. The court would find the most
reasonable depreciation rate would be the one nearer the faster rate allowed by the
Internal Revenue Service's regulations.

The court finds that the fair market^ value

established by the Defendant's expert of $30,000.00, does not fairly take into
consideration the history of the business and its performance over time and is more a
liquidation sale price than the sale price of a going concern. From the evidence the
court finds a fair market value of the business is approximately $100,000.00. There is
owing on the business an obligation in the amount of $35,000.00 to First Security Bank.
The court therefore finds the net value of the business is $65,000.00.
34.

The court does not consider the transaction between the Video

Palace and Ms. Stein in 1993 to have been an arms length transaction and therefore the
court has not considered that for valuation purposes.
35.

The court finds that in addition to the monies paid to the children,

family expenses have been paid from the business and that family expenses for other
household supplies, food, transportation and entertainment have been subsidized by the
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business.
36.

The court finds that each of the parties had in their possession

certain furniture and fixtures. The court is unable, based on the evidence, to value these
items.
37.

The court does find that the parlor grand piano in the Plaintiffs

possession was purchased with funds given to her by her parents and is thus a gift from
them. It is not part of the marital estate.
38.

The court finds during the course of the marriage, the Defendant has

acquired certain tools, equipment, personal property and firearms.
39.

The court finds the parties have incurred debts during the course of

the marriage, to-wit: a mortgage on each of the homes, a balance due and owing on the
Video Palace business, a balance due and owing to the Oswald Profit Sharing Plan, the
obligation due on the airplane in the business known as Flying Start, taxes owing on the
Bountiful Blvd. home, the debts the Defendant has incurred since separation to Zions on
the piano and car purchased for Nicole.
40.

The court finds neither of these parties will be able to maintain the

same standard of living that was available while they were residing together. The court
finds that the Plaintiffs requested expenses are unreasonable regarding, the amount that
she claimed for tuition when the court sees no real advantage to additional education,
for entertainment expenses in excess of $100.00 per month, for the children's expenses
in the amount of $200.00 per month in light of her obligation to pay child support and for
vacation expenses of $150.00 per month. Taking these into consideration, the court
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finds the Plaintiff has reasonable expenses of $2,724.00 per month.
41.

The court finds the expenses claimed by the Defendant are

unreasonable, that food expense for 3 people in excess of $400.00 per month is
excessive, particularly in light of the court's finding that the cost of food, household
supplies, transportation and expenses are subsidized to some extent by the Video
Palace as valid business expenses, the clothing expense, in excess of $100.00 per
month is also unreasonable, as is a dental and medical expense of $150.00 per month
where each of the parties carry health and dental insurance.

Entertainment expenses

in excess of $100.00 per month is also unreasonable given the manner in which the
business expenses are handled. The court further finds the obligation on Nicole's car
is a voluntary obligation incurred by the Defendant after separation and that any sum for
Nicole's car in excess of $175.00 per month is excessive, given the circumstances of
these parties. The court further finds that the deduction of $400.00 per month for a new
car for the Defendant is also excessive given the circumstances of the parties. The
court further excludes the payment to Zions Bank for the piano which was purchased
after the date of separation, the court considers it frivolous. The court further finds that
a claim of $150.00 per month for allowances for the children is unreasonable in light of
their history of employment with the business. The mortgage payment claimed by the
Defendant is in excess to the sum of $483.00 per month (based on the award of the
property made by the court).

Based on the foregoing analysis, the court finds a

reasonable expense for the Defendant is approximately $4,000.00 per month.
42.

The Plaintiff has a net income of $1,588.00 per month plus $300.00
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from a rental of a room in the home. In addition, she should receive approximately
$300.00 per month in interest income from funds that the court has determined it will
award to her. Even with this income, the court has found that she is without sufficient
funds to meet her reasonable expenses.
43.

The court has determined the Defendant has wages of $6,000.00 per

month with a net income of $4,500.00 to $4,700.00 per month, not including monies
which he is able to receive from the business or money that he saves by subsidizing
family obligations through business expenses. In addition, he will have child support
from the Plaintiff in the sum of approximately $300.00 per month.
44.

The Defendant has incurred attorney's fees of $20,653.00 based on

a total of 165 hours attributed by counsel and co-counsel.
45.

The court finds the Plaintiff has incurred attorney's fees of

approximately $30,000.00 based on 319 hours having been contributed by two attorneys
and two paralegals. Mrs. Jefferies did much of the computations as to the graphs and
business expenses offered into evidence by the Plaintiff.
46.

The court finds that this case was not extremely complicated, it did

have certain novel issues as to the retirement and unusual factual issues* regarding the
family business and its value. However, the court finds that to have spent 319 hours on
this particular case is unreasonable. The court finds that given the complexity of the
case, the nature of the issues, the results obtained, that 150 hours is a reasonable
amount of time to be spent on this case by an attorney who is knowledgeable in the area
of domestic relations as these two attorneys are. A reasonable attorney's fee would be
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$125.00 per hour.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the court now makes and enters the
following
CONCLUSION OF LAW
1.

The court has jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter of this

2.

Each of the parties should be awarded a Decree of Divorce from the

action.

other on the grounds of irreconcilable differences the same to become final upon signing
and entry.
3.

The care, custody and control of the minor children of the parties

should be awarded to the Defendant as stipulated *by the parties.
4.

The Defendant should be enjoined from planning competing activities

for the children on dates of scheduled visitation and from otherwise interfering with
visitation.
5. Visitation is something that will have to be worked out between the
Plaintiff and the children. Recognizing that problem and that the children may not be
willing to go overnight, the court orders visitation every other Saturday and at least four
hours on an evening during the off weeks. Subject to the foregoing, the court orders
standard visitation pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 30-3-35.
6. By application of the Uniform Child Support Guidelines of the State of
Utah, the Plaintiff should pay to the Defendant the sum of $307.00 per month as child
support for the two minor children of the parties. Child support should continue for each
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child until that child attains majority and graduates from high school with his/her regularly
scheduled graduating class. Income withholding provision of Utah Code Ann. 62A-11401 et seq. shall apply.
7.

The Defendant should maintain primary health insurance for the

children subject to that being available through his employment. The parties are to
share any uninsured medical expenses with the Plaintiff paying one-third and the
Defendant paying two-thirds. The Defendant shall pay any regular office and ordinary
medical expenses. The Plaintiff is to share only in the extraordinary uninsured medical
expenses.
8.

The Plaintiff should be awarded the home on Bountiful Boulevard

subject to the mortgage thereon and the equity therein in the amount of $163,6606.00
for the reason that the Plaintiff is presently living in the home and the Defendant
voluntarily removed himself therefrom.

Given the disparity of income between the

parties, it is highly unlikely that Plaintiff could purchase -such a home on her own.
Further, by allocating this equity to the Plaintiff, it allows the Defendant to retain a
greater portion of his retirement.
9.

The home of the parties on Elaine Drive should be awarded to the

Defendant subject to the mortgage thereon and together with the equity of approximately
$76,120.00 for the reason that is where the Defendant and the children have been
residing since the separation. It appears to meet their needs. Given the Defendant's
income, he has the capacity to move up if he so desires.
10.

The Plaintiff should be awarded the Subaru Wagon with a value of
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$4,100.00. The Defendant should be awarded the 1986 Olds Toronado with a value of
$2,900.00 and the 1991 Subaru and debt thereon with a net value of $600.00.
11.

The Plaintiff should be awarded the airplane subject to the

indebtedness thereon in the amount of $15,135.00 for an equity of $40,318.00. The
Defendant should be awarded the spare airplane engine. P*tm<£>£
12.

(/
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The Defendant should be awarded his interest in the 9.69 acres and

the one-forth interest in the Jordan Heights Partnership property subject to a lien in the
amount of $28,000.00 to the Oswald Profit Sharing plan, leaving a net equity in those
two parcels of $20,816.00. The Defendant should be further awarded the 8.25 percent
interest in the 26 acres with a net equity of $4,141.00 and the condominium purchased
subsequent to the separation which has an equity of $5,000.00.
13.

The Plaintiff should be awarded the savings account at First Security

Bank in its original sum of $10,995.00 for the reason that she had the use and benefit
of that account during the pendency of these matters and has used certain of those
sums to pay her expenses during that period.
14.

The Plaintiff should be awarded the 401 (K) in the amount of

15.

Each of the parties should be awarded half of the sums in the Dean

$12,716.00.

Witter Reynolds account in the amount of $145,725.00 plus any accrued interest and
dividends. Any income taxes incurred as a result of this division should be born equally
by the parties.
16.

The Plaintiff should be awarded her Beneficial Life policy with a cash
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value of $775.00.
17.

The Defendant should be awarded his Beneficial Life policy with a

cash value of $3,399.00, his Penn Life policy with a cash value of $700.00 and his
Principal Mutual policy with a cash value of $659.00.
18.

The Defendant should be awarded the "Video Palace" together with

the furniture and fixtures, the vehicle and the hot air balloon subject to the indebtedness
thereon of $35,000.00, leaving a net equity of $65,000.00.
19.

The court finds that the retirement program of the Defendant in the

form of a 457 plan and a 401(a) plan are substantially different from social security in
both the rate of return and the ownership interest which the Defendant has in the plans.
That ownership interest allows him to be fully vested in all sums contributed and among
other things allows him to withdraw those sums in lump sum or periodically as he may
choose upon retirement, death or termination and to pass his interest to beneficiaries.
All of these benefits are substantially more favorable than the usual social security
benefits. For that reason, the court does not accord to these retirement benefits the
same protection as is required the federal law for social security. Therefore, the court
concludes that these retirement plans are joint marital property and subject to division
in this proceeding.
20.

The Defendant should be awarded the sums in his 457 plan in the

amount of $233,412.00 free and clear of any claim of the Plaintiff.
21.

The Plaintiff should be awarded $201,000.00 of the 401(a) plan free

and clear of any claim of the Defendant and any interest or accumulation (including
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additional payments) in ratio this fund is divided until actual division occurs. These
should be passed to her by appropriate QDRO which should be entered by the court to
implement this award after entry of the decree of divorce. The Defendant should be
awarded $21,800.00 from the 401(a) plan free and clear of any claim of the Plaintiff and
any interest or accumulation (including additional payments) in ratio this fund is divided
until actual division occurs.
• 22.

The court concludes that the total value of the property previously

awarded should be approximately equal.
23.

Each of the parties should be awarded those items of personal

property presently in their possession together with any furniture and fixtures. The court
finds that they are essentially equal.
24.

Each of the parties should be awarded his or her own personal

property and possessions.
25.

The Defendant should be awarded his tools, power equipment and

sporting goods including firearms free and clear of any claim of the Plaintiff.
26.

The court orders that the tools and equipment used for yard care and

maintenance are to be divided equally between the parties. As an exception to the
court's ruling above, the court orders that Defendant return to the Plaintiff the electric
garage door opener, hose attachments to the vacuum, one of the computers, a CD
player and in the event that there is more than one Sega and Nintendo player, one is to
be returned to the Plaintiff.
27.

The parties are ordered to divide equally any family photographs
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which they may have acquired during the course of their marriage.
28.

The court considers those items of furniture and fixtures used by the

children to be the property of the children.
29.

The court considers that the $17,000.00 initially contributed by the

Plaintiff to the marriage and the $17,000.00 initially invested in the home purchased by
the Defendant to have become marital property. The funds have been co-mingled and
as such have lost their identity as separate premarital property. Therefore, the court
considers them as marital property in the allocation made between the parties herein.
30.

The court finds that stock given to the Plaintiff by her uncle which

has remained in her name has not been co-mingled and is her sole and separate
property and not subject to distribution.
31.

The sums in the children's names at Shearson-Lehman and Lon's

bond are awarded to the children.
32.

The Plaintiff should be ordered to assume and discharge the debt

due and owing on the home in Bountiful Boulevard, including any taxes and the
$15,135.00 debt due and owing on the plane and to hold the Defendant harmless
thereon.
33.

The Defendant should be ordered to assume and discharge the debt

and obligation due on the home on Elaine Drive, the obligation due and owing on the
business, the balance of any sums owing on the airplane in excess of $15,135.00, the
balance due and owing to the Oswald Profit Sharing plan and any other debts or
obligations incurred during the course of the marriage or which he has incurred
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subsequent to the day of separation. The Defendant should be ordered to hold the
Plaintiff harmless thereon.
34.

The court finds that the Plaintiff is in need of additional support to

meet her monthly expenses. Although, the court finds that the Plaintiff will receive
certain interest payments from the funds awarded to her, she will still need additional
support in order to meet her monthly expenses. The court concludes that in light of the
Defendant's income from the Wasatch Front Regional Council, his other investments,
child support he will be receiving and the benefits incident to the ownership of the
business, he is in a position to provide assistance to the Plaintiff by way of support. The
court therefore concludes that the Defendant should be ordered to pay to the Plaintiff the
sum of $700.00 per month as and for alimony.
35.

The court further concludes that a reasonable attorney's fee in this

matter would be $18,750.00, given the difficulty of the case, the issues involved and the
result.

The court concludes that the Plaintiff has the ability to contribute to said

attorney's fees but is without sufficient funds to pay all her fees without a substantial
invasion of the marital estate given her income. The court finds that the Defendant given
his superior earnings ability, has the ability to contribute to such fees and orders that he
does so in the amount of $8,750.00.
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DATED this ^ s ^ d a y of

\VW-

1994.

BY THE COURT:

RODNEY £J PAGE, District Court Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
^

I hereby certify that I caused to be hand-delivered this

' ' day of May,

1994 a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

to the following individual:
Rodney R. Parker, Esq.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Counsel for Defendant
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
—oooOOOooo—
RUTH ANN JEFFERIES,
DECREE OF DIVORCE
Plaintiff,
v.

Civil No. 924701612DA

WILBUR R. JEFFERIES,

Judge: Rodney S. Page

Defendant

—oooOOOooo—
The above-entitled matter came before the court, the Honorable Rodney
S. Page presiding for trial on the 9th and 10th of December, 1993, and closing argument
on December 15, 1993. The Plaintiff was present in person represented by counsel,
David S. Dolowitz.

The Defendant was present in person represented by counsel

Rodney R. Parker.

The court after hearing the evidence of the parties and the

arguments of counsel, ruled on certain matters from the bench at the conclusion of trial
and reserved for further ruling the issues of property division, alimony and related
matters. Having considered those matters and being fully advised in the premises, the
court issued its ruling on the 18th day of February, 1994. The court having heard the
evidence of the parties, and being fully advised in the premises and having herebefore

JUDGMENT ENTERED
BY .)h\\*

00251647

entered the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that:
1.

This court has jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter of this

2.

Each of the parties is awarded a Decree of Divorce from the other

action.

on the grounds of irreconcilable differences, the same to become final upon signing and
entry.
3.

Care, custody and control of the minor children of the parties is

awarded to the Defendant.
4.

The Defendant should be enjoined from planning competing activities

for the children on dates of scheduled visitation and from otherwise interfering with
visitation.
5. Visitation is something that will have to be worked out between the
Plaintiff and the children. Recognizing that problem and that the children may not be
willing to go overnight, the court orders visitation every other Saturday and at least four
hours on an evening during the off weeks. Subject to the foregoing, the court orders
standard visitation pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 30-3-35.
6. By application of the Uniform Child Support Guidelines of the State of
Utah, the Plaintiff shall pay to the Defendant the sum of $307.00 per month as child
support for the two minor children of the parties. Child support shall continue for each
child until that child attains majority and graduates from high school with his/her regularly
scheduled graduating class. Income withholding provision of Utah Code Ann. 62A-11-
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401 et seq. shall apply.
7.

The Defendant shall maintain primary health insurance for the

children subject to that being available through his employment. The parties are to
share any uninsured medical expenses with the Plaintiff paying one-third and the
Defendant paying two-thirds. The Defendant shall pay any regular office and ordinary
medical expenses. The Plaintiff is to share only in the extraordinary uninsured medical
expenses.
8.

The Plaintiff is awarded the home on Bountiful Boulevard subject to

the mortgage thereon and the equity therein in the amount of $163,606.00 for the reason
that the Plaintiff is presently living in the home and the Defendant voluntarily removed
himself therefrom. Given the disparity of income between the parties, it is highly unlikely
that Plaintiff could purchase such a home on her own. Further, by allocating this equity
to the Plaintiff, it allows the Defendant to retain a greater portion of his retirement.
9.

The home of the parties on Elaine Drive is awarded to the Defendant

subject to the mortgage thereon and together with the equity of approximately
$76,120.00 for the reason that is where the Defendant and the children have been
residing since the separation. It appears to meet their needs. Given the Defendant's
income, he has the capacity to move up if he so desires.
10.
$4,100.00.

The Plaintiff is awarded the Subaru Wagon with a value of

The Defendant is awarded the 1986 Olds Toronado with a value of

$2,900.00 and the 1991 Subaru and debt thereon with a net value of $600.00.
11.

The Plaintiff is awarded the airplane subject to the indebtedness
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thereon in the amount of $15,135.00 for an equity of $40,318.00. The Defendant is be
awarded the spare airplane engine.
12.

The Defendant is awarded his interest in the 9.69 acres and the one-

forth interest in the Jordan Heights Partnership property subject to a lien in the amount
of $28,000.00 to the Oswald Profit Sharing plan, leaving a net equity in those two parcels
of $20,816.00. The Defendant is further awarded the 8.25 percent interest in the 26
acres with a net equity of $4,141.00 and the condominium purchased subsequent to the
separation which has an equity of $5,000.00.
13.

The Plaintiff is awarded the savings account at First Security Bank

in its original sum of $10,995.00 for the reason that she had the use and benefit of that
account during the pendency of these matters and has used certain of those sums to
pay her expenses during that period.
14.

The Plaintiff is awarded the 401(K) in the amount of $12,716.00.

15.

Each of the parties is awarded half of the sums in the Dean Witter

Reynolds account in the amount of $145,725.00 plus any accrued interest and dividends.
Any income taxes incurred as a result of this division should be born equally by the
parties.
16.

The Plaintiff is awarded her Beneficial Life policy with a cash value

17.

The Defendant is awarded his Beneficial Life policy with a cash value

of $775.00.

of $3,399.00, his Penn Life policy with a cash value of $700.00 and his Principal Mutual
policy with a cash value of $659.00.

00251650
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18.

The Defendant is awarded the "Video Palace" together with the

furniture and fixtures, the vehicle and the hot air balloon subject to the indebtedness
thereon of $35,000.00, leaving a net equity of $65,000.00.
19.

The court finds that the retirement program of the Deienaanx in the

form of a 457 plan and a 401(a) plan are substantially different from social security in
both the rate of return and the ownership interest which the Defendant has in the plans.
That ownership interest allows him to be fully vested in all sums contributed and among
other things allows him to withdraw those sums in lump sum or periodically as he may
choose upon retirement, death or termination and to pass his interest to beneficiaries.
All of these benefits are substantially more favorable than the usual social security
benefits. For that reason, the court does not accord to these retirement benefits the
same protection as is required the federal law for social security. Therefore, the court
concludes that these retirement plans are joint marital property and subject to division
in this proceeding.
20.

The Defendant is awarded the sums in his 457 plan in the amount

of $233,412.00 free and clear of any claim of the Plaintiff.
21.

The Plaintiff is awarded $201,000.00 of the 401(a) plan free and

clear of any claim of the Defendant and any interest or accumulation (including additional
payments) in the ratio this fund is divided until actual division occurs. These should be
passed to her by appropriate QDRO which should be entered by the court to implement
this award after entry of the decree of divorce. The Defendant is awarded $21,800.00
from the 401(a) plan free and clear of any claim of the Plaintiff and any interest or
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accumulation (including additional payments) in ratio this fund is divided until actual
division occurs.
22.

The court concludes that the total value of the property previously

awarded should be approximately equal.
23.

Each of the parties is awarded those items of personal property

presently in their possession together with any furniture and fixtures. The court finds that
they are essentially equal.
24.

Each of the parties is awarded his or her own personal property and

25.

The Defendant is awarded his tools, power equipment and sporting

possessions.

goods including firearms free and clear of any claim of the Plaintiff.
26.

The court orders that the tools and equipment used for yard care and

maintenance are to be divided equally between the parties. As an exception to the
court's ruling above, the court orders that Defendant return to the Plaintiff the electric
garage door opener, hose attachments to the vacuum, one of the computers, a CD
player and in the event that there is more than one Sega and Nintendo player, one is to
be returned to the Plaintiff.
27.

The parties are ordered to divide equally any family photographs

which they may have acquired during the course of their marriage.
28.

The court considers those items of furniture and fixtures used by the

children to be the property of the children.
29.

The court considers that the $17,000.00 initially contributed by the

00251652
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Plaintiff to the marriage and the $17,000.00 initially invested in the home purchased by
the Defendant to have become marital property. The funds have been co-mingled and
as such have lost their identity as separate premarital property. Therefore, the court
considers them as marital property in the allocation made between the parties herein.
30.

The court finds that stock given to the Plaintiff by her uncle which

has remained in her name has not been co-mingled and is her sole and separate
property and not subject to distribution.
31.

The sums in the children's names at Shearson-Lehman and Lon's

bond are awarded to the children.
32.

The Plaintiff is ordered to assume and discharge the debt due and

owing on the home in Bountiful Boulevard, including any taxes and the $15,135.00 debt
due and owing on the plane and to hold the Defendant harmless thereon.
33.

The Defendant is ordered to assume and discharge the debt and

obligation due on the home on Elaine Drive, the obligation due and owing on the
business, the balance of any sums owing on the airplane in excess of $15,135.00, the
balance due and owing to the Oswald Profit Sharing plan and any other debts or
obligations incurred during the course of the marriage or which he has incurred
subsequent to the day of separation. The Defendant is ordered to hold the Plaintiff
harmless thereon.
34.

The court finds that the Plaintiff is in need of additional support to

meet her monthly expenses. Although, the court finds that the Plaintiff will receive
certain interest payments from the funds awarded to her, she will still need additional
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support in order to meet her monthly expenses. The court concludes that in light of the
Defendant's income from the Wasatch Front Regional Council, his other investments,
child support he will be receiving and the benefits incident to the ownership of the
business, he is in a position to provide assistance to the Plaintiff by way of support. The
court therefore concludes that the Defendant is ordered to pay to the Plaintiff the sum
of $700.00 per month as and for alimony.
35.

The court further concludes that a reasonable attorney's fee in this

matter would be $18,750.00, given the difficulty of the case, the issues involved and the
result.

The court concludes that the Plaintiff has the ability to contribute to said

attorney's fees but is without sufficient funds to pay all her fees without a substantial
invasion of the marital estate given her income. The court finds that the Defendant given
his superior earnings ability, has the ability to contribute to such fees and orders that he
does so in the amount of $8,750.00.
DATED this <2S^day of

tYW

, 1994.

BY THE COURT:

.. JM

<LL

RODNEY Si PAGE, District Court Judge

8

00251654

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused to be hand-delivered this

it

* I j a y of May,

1994, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Decree of Divorce to the following
individual:
Rodney R. Parker, Esq.

SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Counsel for Defendant
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